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NOTE
FOR PEAT’S SAKE!
JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATIONS, HAWKES, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Wesley A. Vorberger†
ABSTRACT
Under the Clean Water Act, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) is
vested with the power to regulate “waters of the United States” by
administering a statutorily mandated permit process. A preliminary part of
this permit process is the issuance of a Jurisdictional Determination (“JD”),
which declares whether the property in question is considered to contain
“waters of the United States” subject to the permit process. There are two types
of JDs: preliminary and approved. JDs can also be revised by the Corps for
various reasons. Until the Eighth Circuit issued its decision in Hawkes v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, only approved JDs could be appealed, and only
through the Corps administrative appeal process. Prior to Hawkes and under
Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, JDs were not subject to judicial
review in the federal courts because according to the Fifth Circuit a JD is not a
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court, as
required under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Hawkes, however,
held that each of the criteria for reviewability was present in a JD, and that it
was thus subject to judicial review. This split in the circuits will be short lived,
as the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on Hawkes and will conclusively
answer the question of a JD’s reviewability. The issue before the Court in
Hawkes is whether a revised approved JD meets the requirements of finality
and adequacy of remedy under the APA and is subject to judicial review.
This Note seeks to provide the best framework for analyzing the
reviewability of a JD, using the strongest arguments in support of Hawkes’
holding, while, at the same time, delineating the court’s proper role and its
power of judicial review. It is the position of this Note that Hawkes was
ultimately correct in its holding that a JD is subject to judicial review under the
APA. However, the court’s rationale in Hawkes is flawed in two main respects.
First, Hawkes inappropriately emphasizes the regulatory burden and impact
of the permit process, and fails to make the stronger argument that a JD is, by
† Editor-in-Chief, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 11. J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law (2017); B.S., Liberty University, 2010. I would like to dedicate this
Note to my wife, Melanie. Whatever I accomplish is made possible because of God’s blessing
and her support.
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its very nature, a final agency action. By focusing on the JD itself, the court
could have clearly demonstrated that a JD not only creates an obligation to
complete the permit process, but also determines rights of the landowner.
Second, the court should have tempered its analysis with the concerns of Judge
Kelly’s concurring opinion and should not have been so critical of the Corps
and the cost and efficiency of the entire regulatory scheme. In its prudential
critique of this scheme, the court transgressed it constitutional power of judicial
review by wrongly answering a political question. The court in Hawkes should
have avoided this critique and addressed only the matter before it. While the
Supreme Court should affirm the holding in Hawkes, it should avoid such a
prudential critique in its analysis of the issue. Overall, a proper understanding
of the strengths and flaws of Hawkes will help yield the correct outcome on
appeal and illustrate the appropriate analysis that should be used in the
process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hawkes v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers epitomizes the struggle between
regulatory agencies and regulated citizens. In Hawkes, the plaintiff sought
judicial review of a Jurisdictional Determination (“JD”) made by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.1 The JD declared the plaintiff’s land was under the
jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act and subject to an involved permit
process.2 The District Court held that the approved JD was not a “final agency
action” and thus not reviewable.3 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court’s ruling, and held that the approved JD was a
“final agency action” subject to judicial review.4
It is the position of this Note that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Hawkes reached the correct conclusion regarding the reviewability of the JD,
contrary to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers.5 Since the Supreme Court of the United States has granted
certiorari on Hawkes to settle the issue of a JD’s reviewability under the APA,6

1. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015).
2. Id. at 998, 1000.
3. Id. at 996.
4. Id. at 1002.
5. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub
nom., Kent Recycling Servs., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015).
6. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hawkes on the following question presented:
Whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ determination that the
property at issue contains “waters of the United States” protected by the Clean
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this Note will seek to provide a defense of Hawkes, albeit a critical one. This
will be done by demonstrating the reviewability of a JD through precedential
and statutory analysis as well as by scrutinizing the court’s inappropriate
prudential critique of the Corps’ regulatory scheme. A proper resolution on
appeal will not only provide the landowners with a new avenue to challenge
the determination of the Corps, but also prevent the possibility of any
regulatory abuse.
II. STATUTORY AND CASE LAW BACKGROUND
To properly understand what is happening in Hawkes, it is important to
recognize the interplay between several relevant statutes and cases. These
statutes and cases serve as the basis for any court deciding whether judicial
review is appropriate for a JD. The two statutes relevant here are the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”)7 and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).8 These
two acts work together for the regulatory purpose of “maintain[ing] the . . .
integrity of the Nation’s waters”9 under the CWA. To the extent not specified
in the CWA, the APA controls the specific requirements and restrictions to
which agencies must adhere in executing their congressionally delegated
power. Furthermore, three relevant cases, Sackett v. Environmental
Protection Agency,10 Bennett v. Spear,11 and Belle v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers,12 provide the precedential constellation Hawkes must use to
navigate the issue at hand. These cases build upon one another and lay the
groundwork for the circuit split as to whether a JD is a final agency action,
with no other adequate remedy in a court, subject to judicial review under
the APA.

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1362 (7); see 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., constitutes “final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. 704, and
is therefore subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. 701 et seq.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015).
7. See generally 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq. (West 2016).
8. See generally 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 500 et seq. (West 2016).
9. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West 2016).
10. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
11. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
12. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub
nom., Kent Recycling Servs., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015).
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A. The Clean Water Act
The statutory authority for regulating wetlands, like the one at issue in
Hawkes, comes from the CWA. The CWA purports to regulate for the
purpose of maintaining and restoring the “chemical, physical and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”13 This ambitious goal was initially set out in
1948, under what was called the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.14 It was
later amended, both in 1972 and 1977, and became what is now known as the
CWA.15 At issue in Hawkes is 33 U.S.C. § 1344, which gives the Secretary of
the Army, via the Chief of Engineers, authority to issue permits “for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified
disposal sites.”16 The CWA exercises its enforcement power under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319, which provides for various administrative, civil, and criminal
penalties.17
A part of the permit process authorized by 33 U.S.C. § 1344 involves the
issuance of a JD by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to landowners seeking
a permit. All JDs fall into one of two categories:18 preliminary19 or approved.20
Under the CWA, a JD is defined as “a written Corps determination that a
wetland and/or waterbody is subject to regulatory jurisdiction under Section
404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1344) . . . .”21 A JD is based on several
factors such as “indicators of adjacency to navigable or interstate waters;
indicators that the wetland or waterbody is of part of a tributary system; or
indicators of linkages between isolated water bodies and interstate or foreign
commerce.”22 Additionally, an approved (or final) JD is subject to an
13. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West 2016).
14. Jonathan D. Sater, Sackett v. EPA: The Murky Confluence of Due Process and
Administrative Compliance Orders Under the Clean Water Act, 7 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 329, 339
(2013).
15. Id.
16. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a), (d) (West 2016).
17. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (West 2016).
18. 33 C.F.R. § 331.2 (2016) (“All JDs will be in writing and will be identified as either
preliminary or approved.”).
19. Id. (“Preliminary JDs are written indications that there may be waters of the United
States on a parcel or indications of the approximate location(s) of waters of the United States
on a parcel. Preliminary JDs are advisory in nature and may not be appealed. Preliminary JDs
include compliance orders that have an implicit JD, but no approved JD.”).
20. Id. (“Approved jurisdictional determination means a Corps document stating the
presence or absence of waters of the United States on a parcel or a written statement and map
identifying the limits of waters of the United States on a parcel. Approved JDs are clearly
designated appealable actions and will include a basis of JD with the document.”).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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administrative appeal process.23 This review process is well illustrated in
Exhibit 1-1 which is provided as an appendix to the relevant Corps
regulations.
Exhibit 1-124

23. See generally 33 C.F.R. § 331.7 (2016); 33 C.F.R. Pt. 331, App. C. (2016).
24. 33 C.F.R. Pt. 331, App. C. (2016).
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It is important to clarify that the issue in Hawkes is whether a revised
approved JD is appealable to a Federal Court and subject to judicial review
under the APA, not whether it is appealable to the administrative agency
under the CWA.25
B. The Administrative Procedure Act
The APA has been called the “heart of administrative law,” and for good
reason.26 “The APA is the foundation of the administrative statutory scheme”
from which government agencies derive their regulatory power.27 The APA
provides agencies with the ability to make legally binding orders.28
Furthermore, the APA sets forth procedures for judicial review of those
orders (unless otherwise specified in the agency’s governing statute).29
Judicial review of an agency’s action may occur when “made reviewable by
statute” or when it is a “final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court.”30 Furthermore, the APA states that “[a]
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”31
Judicial review is permitted under the APA with two exceptions: preclusion
by a subsequent statute or to the extent that “agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law.”32
In light of the APA requirements, parties seeking judicial review naturally
encounter the dispositive questions of: (1) whether an agency action is
considered to be “final” and (2) whether there is no other adequate remedy
in a court (also referred to as “no reasonable alternative” to judicial review).
Without satisfying the requirements of the APA, a court will lack subject
matter jurisdiction and be unable to adjudicate a review of the administrative
25. See 33 C.F.R. § 331.7 (2016) for more information on the Corps administrative appeal
process.
26. See Sater, supra note 14, at 337.
27. See id. at 336. Another commentator has rightly recognized the APA’s proper role and
purpose: “Congress created the APA as a ‘working compromise, in which broad delegations
of discretion were tolerated as long as they were checked by extensive procedural safeguards.’
As a result, Congress established procedural requirements in the APA that went beyond the
obligations of due process.” Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency
Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 405-06 (1987).
28. Sater, supra note 14, at 338.
29. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706 (West 2016).
30. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 704.
31. Id.
32. See 5 U.S.C.A § 701.
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order. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sackett v. E.P.A.33 has been used as
the standard for determining the reviewability of administrative orders.
Furthermore, the Court in Sackett held that the CWA is subject to the judicial
review provisions under the APA.34
C. Sackett v. E.P.A.
In Sackett, the owners of a parcel in Idaho brought a civil action under the
APA against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to challenge
an administrative compliance order (“ACO”).35 The ACO stated that the
landowner’s property was subject to regulation under the CWA.36 An ACO
is a final agency action when it determines rights or obligations, or legal
consequences flow from its issuance, and it marks the consummation of the
agency’s decision-making process.37 The ACO in Sackett ordered the
landowners to restore their property, which had fill material placed on it
pursuant to an EPA “work plan.”38 The district court dismissed Sackett’s civil
action for want of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.39 Although Sackett’s appeal arose out of a dispute
regarding the scope of “navigable waters” under the CWA, the Supreme
Court’s analysis was limited only to the issue of whether the Sacketts could
challenge the ACO in court.40
33. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1369 (2012).
34. Id. at 1374 (“Here, there is no suggestion that Congress has sought to exclude
compliance-order recipients from the Act’s review scheme; quite to the contrary, the
Government’s case is premised on the notion that the Act’s primary review mechanisms are
open to [compliance-order recipients] . . . . The Clean Water Act does not preclude [APA]
review.”).
35. Id. at 1370-71. An “Administrative Compliance Order” is defined under the Clean
Water Act as:
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Administrator
finds that any person is in violation of section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328,
or 1345 of this title, or is in violation of any permit condition or limitation
implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this
title by him or by a State or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by
a State, he shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such section
or requirement, or he shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b)
of this section.
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(3).
36. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1369.
37. Id. at 1371-72.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1371.
40. Id. at 1369.
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The Court held that the ACO was, indeed, a final agency action without
any adequate remedy apart from judicial review under the APA.41 Justice
Scalia, delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, analyzed the issue
according to the standard he had set forth in Bennett v. Spear which defined
when an agency action is final.42 The Court in Bennett stated succinctly that
two conditions must be met for an action to be final: “First, the action must
mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must
not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. Second, the action must
be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which
‘legal consequences will flow.’”43 The Court in Sackett analyzed the ACO
against the Bennett test and held that the Bennett test was, indeed, satisfied.44
The Court further held that the CWA did not expressly or impliedly preclude
judicial review under the APA, finding the Government’s argument that the
CWA was preclusive to be unpersuasive.45 In so doing, the Court reversed the
lower court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.46
Understanding the Court’s precedent in Sackett is critical to the discussion
in Hawkes because the ACO and the JD are often analogized to one another
in determining reviewability.
D. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Subsequent to the decision in Sackett, and while Hawkes was on appeal to
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined in Belle Company v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that a JD is not
considered a “final agency action” and thus is not reviewable under the
APA.47 In Belle, a JD was issued on a parcel of land which was owned by Belle
Company and, in the event it could be used as a solid-waste landfill, subject
to an option to purchase by Kent Recycling, LLC.48 The land at issue had
previously been evaluated by several State and Federal agencies who reached
various conclusions as to its character. Initially, it was classified as nonwetlands not subject to the CWA by the Department of Agriculture and the
EPA. It was then labeled as wetlands subject to the CWA by the Corps. Later
it was declared to be “commenced-conversion cropland” by the Natural
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1371-72. See also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
Bennett,132 S. Ct. at 177-78 (citations omitted).
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371-72.
Id. at 1372-74.
Id. at 1374.
Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 397 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 386.
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Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). Finally, it was determined as having
its status as a wetland (dependent upon how the land was used) by joint
guidance from the Corps and NRCS.49 After having already started and
stopped an application for a permit before, the plaintiffs decided to pursue a
CWA permit once again.50 In response, the Corps issued a JD stating that the
land was considered waters of the United States and subject to the entire
permit process.51 Together, the two companies challenged the JD in U.S.
District Court in Louisiana.52 The District Court granted the government’s
motion to dismiss and stated that the JD was not a “final agency action”
reviewable under the APA.53 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.54
The court held, inter alia, that under Sackett and the current prevailing
doctrine, a JD was not an action in which either rights or obligations were
determined or an action from which legal consequences flowed, making it
non-reviewable under the APA.55 The court analyzed both of the Bennett
conditions to reach its conclusion. In so doing, it relied on the pre-Sackett
case of Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to hold
that the JD did, in fact, serve as the consummation of the Corps’ decisionmaking process.56 However, the court in Belle distinguished the ACO in
Sackett from the JD at issue and held that it did not determine rights or
obligations, nor was it an action from which legal consequences flowed.57 The
court found that unlike an ACO, which ordered restoration of the property,
the JD was merely a “notification of the property’s classification” as a wetland
under the CWA.58 It further distinguished the JD from an ACO by stating
that the JD created no “penalty scheme” and instead of inhibiting the
plaintiff’s obtaining of a permit, the JD encouraged it.59 Lastly, the court
49. Id. at 386-87.
50. Id. at 387.
51. Id.
52. Id. See also Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. CIV.A. 12-247-BAJ, 2013
WL 773730 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2013).
53. Belle, 761 F.3d at 387.
54. Id. at 397
55. Id. at 394.
56. Id. at 389 (citing Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d
586, 591 (9th Cir. 2008)). It should also be noted that Belle comes to the same conclusion as
Fairbanks. As such, the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion in Hawkes runs against two other circuits
(the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit).
57. Id. at 394.
58. Id. at 391.
59. Id. at 392-93.
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noted that the ACO in Sackett notified the landowner of a violation, whereas
the JD at issue in Belle does not state any violation.60 Feeling it had sufficiently
distinguished the JD from the ACO in Sackett, the court held that the JD was
not a “final agency action” and affirmed the District Court’s granting of the
Corps’ motion to dismiss.61
A proper understanding of the CWA, the APA, and of Sackett, Bennett,
and Belle helps to frame the legal landscape for what occurs in Hawkes. Some
regulatory agencies are granted authority under the CWA to issue permits
allowing landowners to discharge dredged or fill material into navigable
waters (or waters of the United States).62 Furthermore, those agencies are
empowered through the APA to issue orders, like an ACO, to rectify or notify
of non-compliance.63 There is, however, a check on the agencies through
judicial review. With few exceptions, judicial review is available when there
is a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court.”64 An agency action is considered “final” when it satisfies the Bennett
test, as the Court applied it in Sackett, which requires that the order be the
“consummation” of the agency’s decision making and that “legal
consequence will flow” from the issuance, determining “rights or
obligations.”65 The court in Belle found the order in Sackett and the JDs issued
by the Corps to be distinguishable, and held that a JD is not considered a
“final agency action” appealable under the APA.66 This set the stage for
Hawkes and the ensuing split between the circuits.
III. HAWKES V. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
A. Hawkes in the District Court
Before Hawkes was on the docket in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
it was in the U.S. District Court in Minnesota.67 The plaintiffs brought a cause
of action against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief regarding the Corps’ JD that the property owned by the

60. Id. at 393.
61. Id. at 394.
62. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a), (d) (West 2016).
63. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West 2016).
64. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701, 704.
65. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
66. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 392-94 (5th Cir. 2014).
67. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2013)
rev’d and remanded, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015).
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plaintiffs was subject to the Corps’ permitting process under the CWA.68 The
property in question was a 530-acre parcel which was undisputedly labelled
a “wetland.”69 It was prized by Hawkes for its “high-quality peat,” which was
capable of supporting his business for “another 10-15 years.”70 In dispute, was
whether the wetland constitutes “waters of the United States.”71 The Corps
contended that “waters of the United States” includes wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters, which the District Court found to be convincing in light of
Supreme Court precedent.72
The chronology of events is one that can be considered reasonable only by
government standards. In March 2007, the plaintiff, Hawkes Company
(“Hawkes”), met with the Corps and the Minnesota Department of Natural
Resources to discuss his plans, which included filling or discharging materials
onto the property.73 Hawkes then applied for a permit in December 2010.74
In January 2011, Hawkes met with the Corps, which tried to convince him
not to use the new property due to the cost and time involved in getting
through the permit process.75 In March 2011, the Corps notified Hawkes that
it had determined the wetland property was connected to the Red River of
the North and thus was regulated by the CWA.76 This required that Hawkes
go through the entire Corps permit process.77 The parties then met several
more times and Hawkes was required to conduct around $100,000 in
assessments on the property.78 In November 2011, Hawkes received a
“preliminary” JD from the Corps which stated that, because the property was
connected to a “relatively permanent water,” which connected it to the Red
River of the North, which was a “navigable water,” the land was under the
jurisdiction of the CWA.79 Hawkes responded by challenging the JD’s

68. Id. at 870-71.
69. Id. at 870.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 870-71.
72. Id. at 870 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139
(1985)).
73. Id. at 870-71
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 871.
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rationale and asserted that it was not connected to a “navigable water” by a
“relatively permanent water.”80
In February 2012, Hawkes received an approved JD from the Corps
asserting they had jurisdiction under a new rationale (stating a “significant
nexus” existed between the property and the Red River of the North).81 In
April 2012, the plaintiffs subsequently appealed the approved JD under CWA
regulations.82 In October of 2012, the Corps Review Officer rejected the
plaintiff’s arguments but ultimately remanded the JD for further
determination regarding the “[p]roperty’s chemical, physical, and biological
effects on the Red River of the North.”83 Finally, in December 2012, the Corps
issued a revised JD, a “final Corps approved jurisdictional decision,” again
stating that the Corps had jurisdiction over the property under the CWA.84
The final revised, approved JD was not appealable.85
Thus, in January 2013, over three years after starting the process, Hawkes
brought his dispute to U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota to
challenge the JD of the Corps.86 The district court in Hawkes dismissed the
plaintiff’s claim, holding that it failed to pass the Bennett test.87 Since Hawkes
was considered a case of first impression within the Eighth Circuit, the
district court relied heavily on an analogous case in the Ninth Circuit,
Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Army Corps of Engineers.88 Following the
court’s rationale in Fairbanks, the district court found that the JD indeed
represented the “consummation of the Corps’ decisionmaking process.”89
“The court in Fairbanks reasoned that when the Corps issues a jurisdictional
determination, and upholds it on administrative appeal, the Corps itself
treats the determination as ‘final.’”90 However, the district court found the
second condition of the Bennett test unsatisfied.91 The court, citing to both
Fairbanks and the district court opinion in Belle, asserted the “[JD] does not

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 873.
88. Id. at 872 (citing to Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d
586 (9th Cir. 2008)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 872-73 (citing Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 543 F.3d at 592).
91. Id. at 874.
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fix [the plaintiff’s] rights or obligations. The Revised JD does not order
Plaintiffs to take any kind of action. Although Plaintiffs may want to obtain
a permit if they wish to expand their mining operations, the Corps has in no
way obligated them to do so.”92
The district court also distinguished between the JDs in the present case
and the ACOs at issue in Sackett.93 While the JD lacked any penalty or
obligation for Hawkes, the Sackett plaintiffs were under the risk of severe
penalty for non-compliance if they refused to act.94 The court further noted
that the JD did not inhibit the plaintiffs from seeking to obtain a permit from
the Corps.95 This, the court concluded, further distinguished the case from
Sackett, since the plaintiff could file suit through the administrative process
by applying for a permit.96 The failure to satisfy both Bennett conditions, and
the availability of other “remedies,” rendered the JD “not reviewable” in the
eyes of the district court.97 This set the stage for the plaintiff’s appeal to the
Eighth Circuit.
B. Hawkes in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a narrow question on
appeal: whether the finality standard in Sackett should also apply to JDs when
the party has neither completed the permit process nor exposed itself to the
risk of substantial penalties by avoiding the process.98 At the outset of the
opinion, the court reiterated the issues and holdings found by the district
court and recognized that authority cited in support of the lower court’s
ruling (Belle) had since been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.99
Nevertheless, the court concluded that both the lower court and the court in
Belle misapplied Sackett and set out to justify its reversal of the lower court.100
The court began by putting forth the relevant statutory law (the CWA)
and then set the tone for the opinion by quoting Rapanos v. United States.101
92. Id. at 875.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 877.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 878.
98. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2013), rev’d
and remanded, 782 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corp of
Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015).
99. Id. at 996-97. See also Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.
2014).
100. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 996.
101. Id. at 996.
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The court stated that the broad definition of “navigable waters” has
empowered the Corps and EPA “to make ‘sweeping assertions of jurisdiction’
over every stream, ditch, and drain that can be considered a tributary of, and
every wetland that is adjacent to, traditional navigable waters.”102 With that,
the court recognized that although the Corps may require a permit to
discharge materials into wetlands that are located adjacent to “waters of the
United States,” it rejected the position that the Corps possessed jurisdiction
under the CWA over “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters.”103 Indeed,
although the appellate court accepted the facts as stated by the district court
with little modification, it noted that the wetland in question was located 120
miles away from the allegedly “adjacent” navigable waters.104
The court concluded its introduction by stating that two tests, both from
Rapanos, were at play.105 The two tests in Rapanos came from the plurality
opinion written by Justice Scalia, the “relatively permanent” test,106 and the
concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, the “significant nexus” test.107 The
court stated that since the Supreme Court “adopted different narrower tests
to determine when wetlands are ‘waters of the United States,’ we held ‘that
the Corps has jurisdiction over wetlands that satisfy either . . . test’ . . . .”108
The heart of the plaintiff’s contention was that the Corps failed both of these
tests.109 Yet the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim was predicated
on the fact that the district court did not consider the revised, approved JD a
“final agency action” under both conditions of the Bennett test and thus not

102. Id. (quoting Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 726–727 (2006) (plurality opinion)).
103. Id. at 997.
104. Id. at 997-98.
105. Id. at 999.
106. The “relatively permanent” test states that “‘the waters of the United States’ include
only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,” such as “streams,” “oceans,”
“rivers,” “lakes,” and “bodies” of water “forming geographical features.” Rapanos v. U.S., 547
U.S. 715, 732-33 (2006) (plurality opinion).
107. The “significant nexus” test states that wetlands “constitute ‘navigable waters’ under
the Act, a water or wetland must possess a “significant nexus” to waters that are or were
navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.” Justice Kennedy further clarified
stating, “wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase
‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands, alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the
region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters . . . understood as “navigable.” Id. at 759, 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 997 (citing United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir.
2009)).
109. Id. at 999.
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suitable for judicial review.110 It was on this point that the court of appeals
focused its analysis.
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the first condition,
that the JD was the “consummation of the Corps’ decisionmaking,” was met
in the Corps’ revised approved JD.111 The court then scrutinized the district
court’s holding that the JD did not satisfy the second Bennett condition. The
court set forth a litany of cases that demonstrated the district court
exaggerated the difference between an “agency order that compels
affirmative action, and an order that prohibits a party from taking otherwise
lawful action.” 112
En route to finding the second Bennett condition satisfied, the court made
several key observations in its flyover of relevant case law. First, the court
noted that the revised approved JD forced the plaintiff to choose between
either paying a substantial cost for the permit process, or to relent to the
frustration and not use the land, or risk various penalties for non-compliant
use.113 Next, the court recognized that the specificity of the order provided an
“even stronger coercive effect” than a similar case involving an ambiguous
agency regulation which required a permit (and which was ultimately
deemed to satisfy the second Bennett condition).114 Lastly, the court found
the order “adversely affect[ed] [the] appellant’s right to use their property in
conducting lawful business activity.”115 Even though the court found the
order was not “self-executing,” it cited to Sackett to reiterate that “the APA
provides for judicial review of all final agency actions, not just those that
impose a self-executing sanction.”116
The majority concluded its opinion by analyzing whether obtaining a
permit or proceeding sans permit and challenging an eventual compliance
order, were adequate remedies under the APA.117 The court recognized that
the district court, and the defendant, failed to recognize the “prohibitive cost”
in either “alternative.”118 The court stated the permit process was
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1000. The court noted that a “biological opinion,” “prescription drug labelling
regulations,” an agency order declaring “certain agricultural commodities were not exempt
from regulations,” and an agency regulation barring the “licensing of stations that enter into
network contract,” all satisfied the second Bennett condition. Id. at 1000-01.
113. Id. at 1001-02.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1001.
116. Id. (citing Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1373 (2012)).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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“prohibitively expensive”119 and the plaintiff’s amended complaint revealed
that the Corps had informed Hawkes that the permit “would ultimately be
refused.”120 This information alone, the court stated, would be sufficient to
satisfy the second Bennett condition.121 Furthermore, commencing the
mining operation and waiting for an ACO would be, in the court’s words,
“plainly an inadequate remedy.”122 Besides reeking of bad faith, since the
plaintiff’s already knew of the permit process, it would expose the plaintiff to
substantial risk of administrative, civil, and criminal penalties.123
The court, channeling Justice Scalia’s righteous indignation at regulatory
overreach in Rapanos, concluded by leveling an indictment against the
Corps. The court is best heard in its own words:
The prohibitive costs, risk, and delay of these alternatives to
immediate judicial review evidence a transparently obvious
litigation strategy: by leaving appellants with no immediate
judicial review and no adequate alternative remedy, the Corps will
achieve the result its local officers desire, abandonment of the peat
mining project, without having to test whether its expansive
assertion of jurisdiction—rejected by one of their own
commanding officers on administrative appeal—is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s limiting decision in Rapanos. For
decades, the Corps has “deliberately left vague” the “definitions
used to make jurisdictional determinations,” leaving its District
offices free to treat as waters of the United States “adjacent
wetlands” that “are connected to the navigable water by flooding,
on average, once every 100 years,” or are simply “within 200 feet
of a tributary.”124
The court finished its critique by stating the Corps’ view of the revised,
approved JD “ignores reality” and ended by quoting Justice Alito’s
concurring opinion in Sackett, stating that without judicial review “the
impracticality of otherwise obtaining review, combined with ’the uncertain
reach of the [CWA] and the draconian penalties imposed for the sort of
violations alleged in this case . . . leaves most property owners with little
119. The court stated: “the average applicant for an individual Corps permit ‘spends 788
days and $271,596 in completing the process.’” Id. (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 727–28).
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practical alternative but to dance to the [agency’s] tune.’”125 With that, the
court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to district court.126
Judge Kelly concurred, but raised several legitimate concerns with the
majority’s reasoning. First, Judge Kelly questioned how much weight the
majority should have put on the inherent difficulty in the permit process as
it relates to determining whether the JD constituted a final agency action.127
Next, Judge Kelly noted the difference between an ACO and a JD, stating that
the former accrues a penalty and the latter possesses no attached penalty at
all.128 However, Judge Kelly ultimately agreed with the majority since there
were no “acceptable options to challenge the JD, absent judicial review.”129 In
concluding there was no other adequate remedy, Judge Kelly pointed to
Sackett and recognized a critical fact: the CWA is not just any other law.130
“[M]ost laws do not require the hiring of expert consultants to determine if
they even apply to you or your property. This jurisdictional determination
was precisely what the Court deemed reviewable in Sackett.”131
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE HOLDING IN HAWKES
The Supreme Court should affirm Hawkes and recognize that a JD
determines both rights and obligations, and is the consummation of the
Corps’ decisionmaking process. For a JD to be subject to judicial review
under the APA, it must be: (1) a final agency action; and (2) there must be no
other adequate remedy avaliable in court (often termed “no other reasonable
alternative” to judicial review).132 As discussed above, to be considered a final
agency action, the two finality conditions put forth in Bennett must be
satisfied.133 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have both recognized that a JD
satisfies the first Bennett condition (i.e. the JD is the consummation of the
Corps’ decisionmaking process.)134 Thus, the court in Hawkes focused
primarily on the second Bennett condition, and on whether there existed any
other adequate remedy in a court.135 Below, two critical points will illustrate
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 1002-03 (citing Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (Alito, J., concurring)).
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1003.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 704.
See supra Section II.C.
See Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2014).
Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1000-01.
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that a JD satisfies the second condition of the Bennett test, and accordingly
the holding in Hawkes should be affirmed for two reasons. First, because the
JD determines the “rights” of the landowner, and second, because the JD
determines the “obligations” of the landowner.
It should be noted at the outset, however, that the court in Hawkes rested
its holding that the second Bennett condition was satisfied on the weak
foundation of the JD’s regulatory impact.136 This emphasis is misplaced. By
focusing on the peripheral impact of the regulatory action, instead of the JD
itself, the court missed an opportunity to analyze the JD for rights and
obligations inherent within it. Comments pertaining to scope and impact are
more relevant in determining whether any other adequate remedy exists to
judicial review, as required by the APA. Yet, looking at the JD itself allows
the courts to properly analyze finality and reviewability under the statutory
framework of the APA and the CWA respectively.
A. The JD Determines the Rights of the Landowner: It is More Than a
Classification
As previously stated, the second Bennett condition requires that the
agency action determine “rights or obligations,” or that “legal consequences
will flow” from its issuance, in order for an agency action to be considered
final, and thus reviewable under the APA.137 When a JD declares a landowner
is subject to the permit process, courts curiously tend to scrutinize JDs in
terms of their obligation-determining capacity without regard to their
potential rights-determining capacity. In reading both Belle and Hawkes it
appears that each court makes a similar assumption in its reasoning: that a
JD declaring the landowner subject to the permit process would appear to
establish solely an obligation to complete it (which both courts focus on in
their analysis).138 This is an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the
second Bennett condition, one which should not hold future courts captive

136. Id. (“[The District Court’s] analysis seriously understates the impact of the regulatory
action at issue by exaggerating the distinction between an agency order that compels
affirmative action, and an order that prohibits a party from taking otherwise lawful action.
Numerous Supreme Court precedents confirm that this is not a basis on which to determine
whether ‘rights or obligations have been determined’ or that ‘legal consequences will flow’
from agency action . . . . Likewise, here, the Revised JD requires appellants either to incur
substantial compliance costs (the permitting process), forego what they assert is lawful use of
their property, or risk substantial enforcement penalties.”).
137. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
138. Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2013),
rev’d and remanded, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corp of
Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015).
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to neglecting consideration of the right-determining nature of the JDs.
Courts should instead fully apply the Bennett test and consider both the
obligation-determining and the right-determining aspects of the JD to see if
either is present, thus satisfying the second condition under Bennett.
The court in Belle failed to truly grapple with the possibility of a JD
declaring a land to not be considered waters of the United States. In this
situation, a landowner would not be subject to the permit process. The court
in Hawkes touched briefly on this possibility and referenced a Regulatory
Guidance Letter (Letter) from the Corps stating:
The Corps’ Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08–02, at 2, 5,
described an Approved JD as a “definitive, official
determination that there are, or that there are not, jurisdictional
‘waters of the United States’ on a site,” and stated that an
Approved JD “can be relied upon by a landowner, permit
applicant, or other affected party . . . for five years” (quotation
omitted).139
Although the main purpose of the Letter was to help landowners understand
the differences between approved JDs, like the ones in both Belle and Hawkes,
and preliminary JDs, which are issued earlier in the regulatory process, the
Letter is powerful evidence of the right-determining nature an approved
JD.140
The Letter goes on to state that an approved JD “can be used and relied on
by the recipient . . . if a CWA citizen’s lawsuit is brought in the Federal Courts
against the landowner or other ‘affected party,’ challenging the legitimacy of
that JD or its determinations.”141 Here, the Corps is clarifying that the

139. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 999.
140. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08-02, June 26, 2008
at 1 (“This Regulatory Guidance Letter (RGL) explains the differences between these two types
of JDs [preliminary and approved] and provides guidance on when an approved JD is required
and when a landowner, permit applicant, or other “affected party” can decline to request and
obtain an approved JD and elect to use a preliminary JD instead.” (footnote omitted)). It
should also be noted that courts have often recognized that administrative agencies, the Corps
being one, are bound not only by the precepts of their governing statutes, but also by those of
their regulations. See Doraiswamy v. Sec’y of Labor, 555 F.2d 832, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(“Without a doubt, ‘an administrative agency is bound not only by the precepts of its
governing statute but also by those incorporated into its own regulations . . . .’”). Although it
is questionable whether the Regulatory Guidance Letter is itself a regulation, at the very least
it illuminates the regulatory precept by which the Corps is bound. See also Abbott-Nw. Hosp.,
Inc. v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 336, 342 (8th Cir. 1983).
141. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08-02, June 26, 2008
at 2.
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approved JD can be used in defending the landowner from lawsuits regarding
how the land is being used pursuant to or in violation of the CWA. If the
approved JD did not determine the rights of the landowner, then how could
it provide a defense for the landowner? The Corps states in the Letter that
this determination is valid for five years, and that it can be “used and relied
on” when its legitimacy has been challenged.142 Thus when a landowner is
challenged in court, they can point to the JD and assert their rights as
determined by the Corps. When the approved JDs in Belle and Hawkes
requiring the landowners to complete the permit process are viewed together
an approved JD that does not require the landowner to complete permit
process, it becomes clear that a JD determines at least rights, if not also
obligations, either of which is sufficient to satisfy the second Bennett
condition.
Moreover, the court in Belle failed to truly address whether rights were
determined. Instead, it focused mainly on whether obligations were
determined by the JD.143 The court merely noted:
[A]uthorizing judicial review of JDs, to the extent that it would
disincentivize the Corps from providing them, would undermine
the system through which property owners can ascertain their rights
and evaluate their options with regard to their
properties before they are subject to compliance orders and
enforcement actions for violations of the CWA.144
Here the court curiously seems to explicitly recognize the role of JDs within
the regulatory system: that their issuance determines the rights of the
landowner prior to punishment under the CWA. Thus, since the JD
“determines rights,” the second Bennett condition should have been
considered satisfied, yet the court would go on to conclude just the
opposite.145
B. The JD Determines the Obligations of the Landowner: It is a Part of the
Permit Process Subject to a Penalty under 33 USC § 1319
A JD issued by the Corps carries with it the obligation of completing the
permitting process, and is a part of the larger penalty scheme under the APA.
142. Id. (stating that approved JD “can be relied upon by a landowner, permit applicant,
or other ‘affected party’ (as defined at 33 C.F.R. § 331.2) who receives an approved JD for five
years.”).
143. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390-94 (5th Cir. 2014).
144. Id. at 394 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added).
145. Id.
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As stated above, the second Bennett condition requires that the agency action
must determine “rights or obligations,” or that “legal consequences will flow”
from its issuance, to be considered final.146 The courts in Hawkes and Belle
focused heavily on the second Bennett condition, specifically on whether
obligations were determined, in evaluating whether the JD was reviewable.
The Fifth Circuit relied on a mountain of precedent, both pre- and postSackett, in attempting to distinguish between a JD and an ACO and held that
the JD was merely a “classification” and that regardless of the prohibitive cost
of compliance with the permit process it was insufficient to consider the JD
a final agency action.147 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, holding that the sheer
cost of compliance and the lack of ready alternatives to judicial review were
sufficient to find that the second Bennett condition was satisfied.148
The court in Belle drew a distinction between the JD at issue and the ACO
in Sackett on grounds that a JD is merely a “classification [of the land in
question] as wetlands . . . not [obligating] Belle to do or refrain from doing
anything to its property.”149 Yet, in the next sentence, the court stated that the
JD “notifies Belle that a 404 permit will be required prior to filling, and [that
the court was] cognizant that the Corps’s permitting process can be costly for
regulated parties.”150 These two statements are befuddling. How is it that no
obligation is determined by the JD, yet the JD notifies the landowner that
they are obligated to complete the permit process?
It appears that something even more elementary could be used to
determine whether obligations are determined by the JD. That is, whether
the JD contains any punitive power. If it can be said that a JD carries with it
a punitive dimension, it must be said to determine obligations (either to act
or refrain from acting). In Belle, the court found that a JD contains “no
penalty scheme.”151 It went on to say that “[i]t imposes no penalties . . . . And
neither the JD nor Corps regulations nor the CWA require [the landowner]
to comply with the JD.”152 Judge Kelly’s concurring opinion in Hawkes
echoed this position by asserting “[a] JD, however, has no such penalty
scheme.”153 Yet in light of the landowner’s reality, these statements seem
more like half-truths. First, while the JD itself does not contain an explicit
146. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
147. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390-92 (5th Cir. 2014).
148. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1001 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015).
149. Belle Co., 761 F.3d at 391.
150. Id.
151. Belle, 761 F.3d at 392.
152. Id.
153. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1003.
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penalty scheme—unlike the ACO—it does contain punitive dimensions.
Second, although the JD does not in and of itself “require” compliance, it puts
the landowner on notice that compliance is required.
The CWA, from which JDs derive their statutory authority, contains a
specific provision that speaks to the Act’s enforcement and implementation.
Under 33 U.S.C. § 1319, the Corps is given the power to issue orders,154 notify
the State and give public notice of infractions, 155 and bring a civil action
against the landowner,156 among several other punitive measures in the event
of non-compliance.157 Although the intricacies of § 1319 are beyond the scope
of this Note, it is important to recognize the several civil, criminal, and
administrative penalties that are included in § 1319. The court in Hawkes
recognized that these penalties loom over the head of any landowner who
would pursue a permit, receive an undesired result via the JD, and then
ignore the agency action and do the activity anyways. They reasoned that
“[b]ecause appellants were forthright in undertaking to obtain a permit,
choosing now to ignore the Revised JD and commence peat mining without
the permit it requires would expose them to substantial criminal monetary
penalties and even imprisonment for a knowing CWA violation.”158 This fact
by itself clearly demonstrates that obligations are determined, and that legal
consequences most certainly flow from the issuance of the JD.
This, however, does not answer Belle’s contention that the JD does not
have a penalty scheme. Indeed, the JD itself does not. However, the critical
distinction is that the JD, although by itself powerless, is a part of the larger
CWA § 1319 penalty scheme, as it is part of the permit process. One need
only look at the “knowing violations” under criminal penalties in §
1319(6)(c)(2) to recognize that a landowner who has read a JD, and willingly
defied it, would easily satisfy the mens rea required by the statutory
prohibitions against unpermitted discharging.159 Thus, in the likely event of

154. 33 U.S.C.A § 1319(a)(1) (West 2016).
155. 33 U.S.C.A § 1319(a)(2).
156. 33 U.S.C.A § 1319(a)(3).
157. See generally 33 U.S.C.A § 1319(a)(6).
158. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2013), rev’d
and remanded, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corp of
Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (emphasis added).
159. In her concurring opinion, Judge Kelly stated that she agreed with other courts that
the penalty for a JD is much more speculative than that found in Sackett, and asserted that the
JD itself has no penalty scheme. Id. at 1003. Furthermore, Judge Kelly stated that Hawkes could
provide a single case where increased penalties were issued against a landowner for violating
a JD. Id. However, Judge Kelly’s position is more of an argument from silence than a death
blow to the idea that there is no punitive dimension to a JD. Her position fails to acknowledge
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conviction, the landowner would be subject to heavy fines and lengthy prison
sentences.160
Furthermore, to find as the court in Belle did that a JD does not “require”
compliance, is much like saying a statute subjecting all cars on public
roadways to registration does not “require” compliance from an aspiring
driver. Indeed, the driver does have several theoretical options: he could not
buy a car and use public transportation; he could buy a car but not drive it;
he could buy a car but only drive it on his own land; or he could buy a car,
not register it, and break the law until he is caught. Yet these options are
absurd. They do not comport with the aspirations of the driver, the reality of
car ownership, or the intent of the legislature. The statute clearly obliges the
driver to register his or her car. Likewise, it is possible to say a JD does not
the role of the JD in the larger CWA penalty scheme, and wrongfully assumes that the JD itself
must include a penalty within its statutory language to have any punitive or obligatory
characteristics.
160. Two specific enforcement provisions, listed below in pertinent part, are particularly
relevant for a landowner who knowingly fails to comply with a JD and does not complete the
permit process:
(2) Knowing violations
Any person who-(A) knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328,
or 1345 of this title, . . .or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by
the Secretary of the Army or by a State;
...
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per
day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both. If
a conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a first conviction
of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not
more than $100,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more
than 6 years, or by both.
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(2) (West 2016).
(3) Knowing endangerment
(A) General rule
Any person who knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, 1317,
1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, . . . or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this
title by the Secretary of the Army or by a State, and who knows at that time
that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury, shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than
$250,000 or imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both. A person
which is an organization shall, upon conviction of violating this
subparagraph, be subject to a fine of not more than $1,000,000. If a conviction
of a person is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such person
under this paragraph, the maximum punishment shall be doubled with
respect to both fine and imprisonment.
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c).
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“require” compliance, but to do so would be disingenuous and does not
comport with the reality of landownership, the aspirations of the landowner,
or the true intent of the Corps. The JD clearly obliges the landowner to
complete the permit process.
These two points, that the JD determines rights and is more than a
“classification,” and that the JD is a part of the permit process subject to the
larger statutory penalty scheme, are important in illustrating the finality of
the JD under the Bennett conditions. Although the court in Hawkes
ultimately rested its holding on the foundation that “no other adequate
judicial remedy”161 existed to judicial review, it is important for the Supreme
Court to recognize that there are aspects intrinsic to the JD itself, removed
from the specific facts of Hawkes, which make it a final agency action
reviewable under the APA. Finality under the Bennett conditions, however,
is just one part of the court’s analysis in determining the reviewability of a
JD. The other part of the court’s analysis centered on if any other adequate
remedy existed, as required by the APA. This will be discussed in greater
detail below, in the context of the court’s great analytical flaw.
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ABANDON ANY PRUDENTIAL CRITIQUE IN
DETERMINING IF ANY OTHER ADEQUATE REMEDY EXISTS
Although the Eighth Circuit was ultimately correct in its holding that a
revised, approved JD is a final agency action subject to judicial review under
the APA, it went too far in analyzing the last requirement under the APA. In
answering the question of whether there is any other adequate remedy in a
court, the court transgressed its role as the judiciary in its analysis. In that
analysis, the Hawkes court went beyond the parties involved to the larger
regulatory framework within which the JD operates, concluding that the cost
and efficiency of the permitting process rendered it an inadequate alternative
to judicial review. Thus, the court improperly injected a prudential criticism
of the executive branch’s regulatory scheme into what should have been a
solely legal analysis of the executive’s actions. On appeal, the Supreme Court
should look to procedural inefficiencies in appealing, not the regulatory
inefficiencies and costs of permitting, in settling the issue of reviewability.
The great irony of Hawkes is that in determining whether the JD is subject to
judicial review, the court of appeals transgressed its own role as the judiciary,
inappropriately using judicial review to tell the Executive Branch how to
operate.

161. Hawkes¸ 782 F.3d at 1001.
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Furthermore, Judge Kelly in her concurring opinion raised several valid
points regarding the JD itself and the majority’s reasoning, which would have
avoided the issues created by the court while still reaching the conclusion that
no other adequate remedy existed. Failing to integrate Judge Kelly’s position,
the majority unnecessarily blemishes an otherwise valid opinion with the hue
of an invalid prudential critique. The Corps is simply acting within its
legitimate delegation of power. Ultimately, any regulatory inefficiencies or
burdensome costs should be legitimately remedied by the Executive or
Legislative branches, and should not be considered dispositive in evaluating
the final requirement for judicial review under the APA. The Supreme Court
must recognize that any comment beyond the controversy before them is
superfluous to its judicial role. Below, both the doctrine of judicial review and
the role of the judiciary will be briefly elucidated to provide the basis for
understanding the Eighth Circuit’s inappropriate prudential critique of the
Corps. Ultimately, it is this reasoning by the Eighth Circuit that should be
abandoned by the Supreme Court, while holding that no other adequate
remedy exists aside from judicial review.
A. Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review
No case has influenced the doctrine of judicial review more than Marbury
v. Madison.162 In Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall set the standard for
the Court’s role as interpreter of the Constitution and as a check among the
various branches of government. Obviously a full treatment of judicial review
is beyond the scope of this Note. Indeed, many great treatments have already
been undertaken.163 Yet, it is important to broach the subject here because it
runs to the heart of what the plaintiffs in Hawkes are seeking, and it is what
the Eighth Circuit inappropriately used in analyzing the reviewability of the
JD. Much like Hawkes, Marbury deals with the interplay of several facets of
governmental mechanics.
Dean Jeffrey Tuomala summarizes the background of Marbury as follows:
In the waning days of his administration, President John Adams
appointed William Marbury to serve as a Justice of the Peace for
the County of Washington of the District of Columbia, an office
created under the Judiciary Act of 1789. Adams signed Marbury’s
commission, and Secretary of State John Marshall affixed the seal
of the United States to it but failed to deliver it to Marbury before

162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
163. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the Foundation of Law, 4
LIBERTY U. L. REV. 297 (2010).
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Adams’ successor, Thomas Jefferson, took office. Jefferson’s
Secretary of State, James Madison, refused to deliver the
commission, so Marbury filed a lawsuit against Madison in the
Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Madison to
deliver the commission. Madison failed to answer Marbury’s
complaint, failed to respond to an order to show cause issued from
the Court explaining why judgment should not issue against him,
and failed to appear at trial, either personally or through counsel.
The Court proceeded to trial in Madison’s absence.164
The Court in Marbury directly and indirectly addressed the issues of
jurisdiction, separation of powers, and most notably judicial review proper,
en route to deciding the fate of Marbury’s commission. For the purposes of
this Note, it is sufficient to recognize some of the main principles of Marbury
and apply them to the court’s reasoning in Hawkes. This is in an effort to
demonstrate how the Eighth Circuit’s rationale could have been stronger by
omitting its prudential critique of the Corps’ administrative process, while
properly finding that no other adequate remedy existed aside from judicial
review.
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the President is accountable
only to the political will of the nation in the exercise of his political powers
and therefore “political” subjects are outside the scope of judicial review.165 It
is the President’s authoritative discretion executed through his or her own
political will, or that which has been delegated to his or her officers, which is
immune from judicial review.166 In describing the nature of the three
branches of government, Dean Tuomala rightly points out that by definition
Executive and Legislative powers are “political or prudential” and are
uniform in their “imposition of will.”167 This puts the discretionary, yet
164. Id. at 301-02.
165. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165-66 (1803) (“By the constitution of the United
States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of
which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political
character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is
authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his
orders. In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the
manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power
to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.”).
166. Id.
167. Tuomala, supra note 163, at 329-30 (“The executive and legislative powers . . . are
political or prudential in nature. In addition to being forward-looking in nature, the political
powers have in common the fact that they emphasize the imposition of will, though always
circumscribed by law. . . . Congress, in exercising the legislative power, makes judgments as to
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constitutional, acts of the Executive and Legislative branches beyond the
reach of judicial review, and subject only to the political consequences of such
an action.
At issue in Hawkes is a blend of Executive and Legislative decisions. The
CWA (Legislative) endows the Corps (Executive) with the ability to
promulgate regulations in the administration of the CWA permit process.168
Challenging the reviewability of the JD invokes Chief Justice Marshall’s
caution in Marbury that political subjects “respect the nation, not individual
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is
conclusive.”169 It is not the role of the Judiciary to excuse absolute compliance
with Executive agencies or Legislative enactments because they are too
inefficient or cumbersome. It has rightly been recognized that “[j]udges may
pass on the propriety of legislative acts or executive implementation only in
a properly constituted judicial case. This requirement provides an internal
check on judicial power.”170 Hawkes was no such case for the Eighth Circuit
to critique the Corps’ regulatory process.171
B. The Judiciary’s Role and its Purpose
A brief survey of the roles of the three branches of government yields a
clear paradigm through which to understand how the court in Hawkes
transgressed its judicial role as it pertains to its critique of the Corps’
regulatory process. The Legislative Branch serves in a forward-looking
capacity, and operates to make rules with uniform application to further a

the best means of achieving constitutional objectives or ends. The President makes his best
judgment in allocating resources and applying force to achieve those ends. The necessity and
expediency of those political judgments are not subject to judicial review. The judicial power
does not entail the exercise of will (courts do not make law; the law already exists), and it does
not entail the use of force (courts do not execute their own judgments; they depend upon the
executive branch). Courts exercise only judgment—not political judgment that is forwardlooking, but judicial judgment that is backward-looking in nature.” (emphasis added)).
168. See generally, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2015).
169. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
170. Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1253, 1271 (1988).
171. A more appropriate case would be after the JD is conclusively recognized as
reviewable, and the merits of the plaintiff’s case are reached by the court. Hawkes, however,
does not truly get to the merits of the case (whether the wetland owned by the plaintiff should
be considered waters of the United States). Here, it is reviewability of the JD (essentially
whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction) that is the question – not whether the
regulatory determination of the Corps is itself legitimate.
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lawful object or purpose.172 The Executive Branch looks forward, imposing
its lawful will on the people in executing the rules put forth by the
legislature.173 Finally, the Judicial Branch operates solely looking backwards,
adjudicating only the case or controversy before it, and giving no thought to
future implications or purposes.174 Furthermore, it is important to reiterate
Chief Justice Marshall’s timeless phrase that “[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”175 while also
recognizing that:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.
Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court.176
With this understanding of the three branches of government in mind, it
becomes clear that great restraint is required to properly adjudicate such
politically charged disputes as the one in Hawkes. Moreover, the court in
Hawkes appears to be looking forward, not backwards, in its discussion of
“reality” and pragmatism.177 Regardless of how difficult it may be, the
judiciary must avoid making political judgments on discretionary decisionmaking or disagreeable enactments by the Executive or Legislative Branches
respectively.
C. The Invalid Prudential Critique in Hawkes
The principal issue in Hawkes is about the reviewability of a Corps
determination, not the content of the JD, not the permit process, and not the
172. Tuomala, supra note 163, at 329 (“The action of legislating . . . is forward-looking or
prospective in nature. . . . The focus is on formulating rules best designed to achieve some
lawful object of government. The process of legislation may entail codifying preexisting law,
be it inalienable rights or general principles of law, but its distinguishing characteristic is that
it designs positive enactments to best achieve legitimate government objectives. The second
characteristic that distinguishes the legislative from the judicial process is that legislation is
framed in general terms regulating all persons similarly situated.”).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
176. Id. at 170.
177. Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2013),
rev’d and remanded, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corp of
Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015).
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Corps itself.178 It is apparent that the Eighth Circuit’s prudential reasoning
inappropriately instructs the court’s rationale, taints its holding, and
transgresses the court’s judicial role as defined in Marbury. It was clear from
the Corps’ discussion with the plaintiffs that, for all intents and purposes, the
permit process was a sham and was going to be ultimately unsuccessful.179
Armed with this information, in addition to the fact that rights were
determined, obligations created, and no other alternative existed aside from
breaking the law, it was clear that the JD should be considered a final agency
action. Moreover, it is important to reiterate the Corps’ admission that
pursuit of a permit would ultimately be unsuccessful.180 Yet, the court delved
further into an analysis of the cost, the burden, and the efficiency of the
permit process and declared it a hurdle too high for the plaintiff to clear.181
Furthermore, in trying to prove the point that government regulation has
grown too unwieldy in the light of ambiguous precedent, the court lost
credibility by declaring the permit process as a whole, not just as applied to
the plaintiffs, an inadequate alternative remedy to judicial review.182 This
pronouncement of virtual invalidity due to regulatory impracticability
sounds of judicial will, not simply judicial review. As such, the court
establishes a precedent that goes too far. The great irony of Hawkes is that in
accusing the Corps’ schematic regulatory overreach, it overreaches itself to
tell the Executive Branch how to do its job.
Transgressing Chief Justice Marshall’s exhortation in Marbury, the court
in Hawkes goes beyond the parties at bar and pronounces a much wider
indictment on the Corps:
The prohibitive costs, risk, and delay of [the permit process and
its alternatives] to immediate judicial review evidence a
transparently obvious litigation strategy: by leaving appellants
with no immediate judicial review and no adequate alternative
remedy, the Corps will achieve the result its local officers desire,
abandonment of the peat mining project, without having to test

178. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 997.
179. Id. at 1001.
180. Id. (“Moreover, the Amended Complaint alleged that the Corps’ District
representatives repeatedly made it clear to Kevin Pierce, to a Hawkes employee, and to the
landowner that a permit to mine peat would ultimately be refused. In our view, this alone
demonstrates that the second Bennett factor is satisfied.” (emphasis original)).
181. Id. (“First, as a practical matter, the permitting option is prohibitively expensive and
futile. The Supreme Court reported in Rapanos, that the average applicant for an individual
Corps permit ‘spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process.’” (citations omitted)).
182. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1001.
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whether its expansive assertion of jurisdiction . . . . For decades,
the Corps has “deliberately left vague” the “definitions used to
make jurisdictional determinations,” leaving its District offices
free to treat as waters of the United States “adjacent wetlands” that
“are connected to the navigable water by flooding, on average,
once every 100 years,” or are simply “within 200 feet of a
tributary.”183
In transgressing the boundaries of judicial review, the court in Hawkes quotes
extensively from Rapanos and Sackett in its holding that an approved JD is
subject to Judicial Review under the APA. The court in Rapanos and Sackett
spoke emphatically against governmental agencies that encroached upon the
rights of citizens in the name of regulatory compliance.184 The court in
Hawkes channeled this sentiment with extensive quotations from both
Rapanos and Sackett and, in this regard, does so to its detriment. One
commentator has noted that “Sackett [was a] step by the Supreme Court in
the direction of hindering the EPA’s enforcement capabilities . . . . [T]he EPA
is doing a job that Congress empowered it to do.”185
In concluding that a revised approved JD was reviewable under the APA,
the court in Hawkes stated that it was compelled to do so by “reality” and “a
properly pragmatic analysis.”186 According to the court, the regulatory
process is impracticable, unnavigable without undue cost or burden to the
plaintiff.187 But cost and efficiency should not change the reviewability of an
action. In this regard, Judge Kelly’s concurring opinion recognizes the court’s
glaring flaw.
Concurring in judgment, Judge Kelly remarked that the JD’s reviewability
is a “close question,” but one which should ultimately be answered in favor

183. Id. at 1001-02.
184. See, e.g., Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); Rapanos
v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726–727 (2006).
185. Jessica Pierce Quiggle, Note, Sackett v. EPA Uses Statutory Interpretation to Limit the
EPA’s Power over Wetlands, Overruling A Majority and Leaving Circuits Split over Due Process,
14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 325, 328 (2013).
186. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1002. The court in Hawkes cites to Bennett to say that “[I]n reality
[the JD] has a powerful coercive effect.” Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997)).
This quote, however, is misplaced. It is one thing to say that the JD “in reality” contains
punitive dimensions, and thus satisfies the second Bennett condition (since it determines an
obligation). See supra Section IV.B. It is quite another to say that the solely because the JD “in
reality” coerces the landowner towards an impracticable regulatory scheme, that reviewability
is now appropriate under the APA (since there is no other adequate remedy). Hawkes, 782
F.3d at 1002. This wrongly puts the emphasis on the agency instead of the action.
187. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1002.
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of the plaintiff.188 Judge Kelly rightly questioned the value of critiquing the
permit process itself as a factor in determining reviewability. She skeptically
questioned “how much weight should be given to the futility of the permit
application for an individual applicant, or the time and cost spent applying,
in determining whether or not the JD constitutes a final agency action.”189
She further noted that “were the Corps to take steps to make the permit
process both more efficient and less costly, the reviewability of the JD would
not change.”190 Although some comment pertaining to the regulatory impact
or scope of the JD may be helpful in determining whether there is any other
adequate remedy to judicial review, making cost and efficiency of those
alternatives the dispositive factors is inappropriate.
Judge Kelly goes on to demonstrate that there is no reasonable alternative
to judicial review, but does so without taking into consideration cost or
efficiency of the regulatory process. Judge Kelly notes that Hawkes has only
two options: (1) break the law, wait for an enforcement action, and raise a
lack of jurisdiction under the CWA as a defense,191 or (2) to go through a
“roundabout process” of applying and appealing:
[The landowners would have to] apply for a permit (on the
grounds that no permit is required) and, if the application is
denied, appeal the denial in court. But what happens if Hawkes is,
after all, granted a permit yet maintains it never needed one in the
first place? It must decline the permit and challenge the original
jurisdiction in court. This roundabout process does not seem to
be an “adequate remedy” to the alternative of simply allowing
Hawkes to bring the jurisdictional challenge in the first instance
and to have an opportunity to show the CWA does not apply to
its land at all.192
This is the path that the majority should have taken in its analysis of the final
requirement for judicial review under the APA. Judge Kelly notes that it is
the procedural inefficiencies of challenging the JD, not the regulatory
inefficiencies of acquiring a permit, which demonstrate an inadequate
remedy and satisfy the second requirement under the APA.
It is important, here, to return to Chief Justice Marshall’s main restraint
on judicial review: “[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which are, by the

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 1003.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court.”193 The court in Hawkes essentially answers a political question.194 The
court rests its holding not on backward-looking judgment, but on a present
and forward-looking prudential critique of pragmatism and “reality.”195 This
transgresses the court’s proper judicial role. Considerations of cost and
efficiency question the Executive’s discretion in how it has regulated and
administered a congressionally enacted program. If the court takes issue with
how the permit process operates, it should call on the President or Congress
to remedy the situation through their respective constitutional avenues.
Courts should not, however, make policy determinations from the bench.
Thus, on appeal, the Supreme Court should look to procedural inefficiencies
in appealing, not the regulatory inefficiencies and costs of permitting, in
settling the issue of reviewability. As Judge Kelly rightly demonstrates, it is
not required to critique the agency to recognize that its action is final and
reviewable.196

193. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
194. The political question that was answered was whether the Corps regulatory process
was too burdensome, based on cost and efficiency, to complete the permit process before the
landowner could appeal. It is helpful, here, to note the basic judicial definition of a political
question. The court in Baker v. Carr provided such a definition and stated as follows:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although
each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (emphasis added). The majority in Hawkes made an
issue of both efficiency and cost, both of which were addressed by Judge Kelly in her
concurring opinion. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1003. It is important to recognize that there is no
judicially discoverable or manageable standard for determining when the permit process
would be sufficiently painless or reasonably priced. Moreover, there is an explicit “lack of
respect” for the discretion and judgment of Executive Branch, almost explicitly, in the court’s
reasoning (particularly in its reliance on Rapanos and Sackett).
195. Id. at 1002.
196. Id. at 1003.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The court in Hawkes was correct in holding that an approved JD by the
Corps was a final agency action, without any other adequate remedy in a
court, and is thus reviewable under the APA. The court, however, should
have focused on the JD itself, and not on the regulatory impact of the action,
in determining whether it should be considered a final agency action under
the Bennett conditions. The JD is more than a mere classification, as it
determines the rights of the landowner. Moreover, the JD also determines the
obligations of the landowner as it is a part of the permit process subject to a
penalty under 33 U.S.C. § 1319. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit should have
dispensed with its prudential critique of the regulatory scheme (referencing
its cost and efficiency) in finding that no other adequate remedy existed, as
such a critique falls outside the court’s constitutional power of judicial review
and its proper judicial role. The majority would have done better to align
itself with the concerns of Judge Kelly’s concurring opinion and omitted the
discussion regarding regulatory efficiency in favor of a concise judicial
interpretation of the law in light of the facts. Thus, the Supreme Court should
affirm Hawkes not based on answering a political question of regulatory
efficiency or affordability, but rather on the inadequacies of violating the law
and the procedural inefficiencies of appealing. Then, perhaps, a landowner
will finally be able to mine peat without fear of the government taking either
his fortune or his freedom.

